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Abstract
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Policy Research Working Paper 9049
This paper uses data obtained from three Moroccan house-
hold surveys that took place between 2000 to 2013, to 
address issues related to the so-called “Arab puzzle.” Welfare 
inequalities are low and declining in Arab countries and 
exist against the backdrop of a growing sense of dissatisfac-
tion and frustration. The paper hypothesizes that welfare 
inequality plays a role, if seen through the lens of absolute 
measures and notably absolute polarization. The paper 
argues that the relatively worse perception of poor, vulner-
able, and lower middle-class Moroccan households mirrors 
the ongoing hollowing out of the welfare distribution 
process and its concentration in the tails. The results of a 
multi-logit regression indicate that polarization is signifi-
cantly correlated to perception and, importantly, that this 
correlation is asymmetric. The poorer are the households, 
the more polarization is perceived to link negatively to the 
well-being of households; and the richer are the house-
holds, the more polarization will positively correlate with 
their perceived well-being. The results are robust to the use 
of classes or quintiles for ranking social groups from the 
poorest to the richest.
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1. Introduction 
Welfare1  disparities are generally found to play an important role in explaining the frustration and 
dissatisfaction that people may have with the societies in which they live; in the most extreme 
cases, these disparities are directly linked to the outbreak of civil conflicts (Hirschmann and 
Rothschild, 1973; Muller, 1985; Esteban and Ray, 1999, 2008, 2011). In this regard, the Middle 
East and North Africa (MENA) region represents an important exception, as in the face of 
apparently low and stagnant inequality, dissatisfaction is rampant (inter alia, Verme et al., 2014, 
Cuesta Leiva et al., 2016, and Devarajan  and Ianchovichina, 2018). What mechanisms might 
explain this puzzle? Drawing on Moroccan data, we show that absolute measures of welfare 
disparities—notably absolute polarization—are significantly correlated to perceptions of 
deprivation, and hence more suitable in explaining the growing discontent characterizing the 
central and lower deciles of welfare distribution.  
At the end of the last decade, the MENA region was the only region in the world with a high 
incidence of large declines in average subjective well-being, with steeper declines for the top 60 
percent of the population, representing mostly the middle class, than the bottom 40 percent, 
representing the poor and vulnerable (Arab Barometer, 2019). This pattern was especially 
pronounced in the countries that had experienced the Arab Spring—the Syrian Arab Republic, 
Libya, Tunisia, the Arab Republic of Egypt, and the Republic of Yemen—but the ranks of the 
unhappy swelled in nearly all Arab countries (Dang and Ianchovichina, 2016).  
However, at first glance, a mismatch is apparent between this generalized dissatisfaction of Arab 
world citizens and inequality. The latter has been stagnant or declining since the end of the 1990s 
(Hassine, 2015; Hlasny and Verme, 2018), although some works question the veracity of the data 
arguing that inequality is underestimated (Alvaredo et al., 2018; van der Weide et al., 2018). 
Likewise, while often identified as one of the root causes of social instability and conflicts, 
polarization has been moderate and stable throughout the period (Esteban and Ray, 2011). 
Interestingly, recent evidence suggests that polarization translates into open conflict in the MENA 
                                                            
1 Since Sen introduced the idea of capabilities after his critiques of utilitarianism and more generally, welfarism, one 
needs to be cautious theoretically. However, as Sen (1999) acknowledges, multi-dimensional functioning comparisons 
on capabilities space may not always be possible, and income may be used as a proxy variable while keeping in mind 
the underlying space of functionings and capabilities. This is our approach here. For a discussion and application of 
capabilities and human development indicators to the MENA region with emphasis on Egypt, please see Khan (2011). 
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region only in the presence of non-humanitarian, non-neutral interventions (Abu-Bader and 
Ianchovichina, 2018).  
While in the MENA region there are many unrefuted studies on the limited linkages between 
relative welfare distribution measures and perception (Verme et al., 2014; Ianchovichina et al., 
2015), the link between perception and absolute measures has been less explored. As opposed to 
relative measures, perception and absolute measures unambiguously indicate an increase in many 
MENA countries; this is reflected in the close to 20 percent increase in the absolute Gini and 
absolute Foster and Wolfson indices.2 When focusing on absolute polarization and applying the 
relative distribution method,3 we observe two contemporaneous effects: (i) a general hollowing 
out of the center of the distribution (see, inter alia, Alderson and Doran 2011, 2013); and (ii) a 
significant concentration in the lower tail, representing the so-called downgrading effect. The 
question that arises in this context is whether this growing absolute polarization, besides showing 
a similar trend, is also related to the generalized sense of dissatisfaction observed in many Arab 
countries. 
Our hypothesis is that absolute polarization is indeed highly correlated with the perception of 
households of their socioeconomic status. The worse perception of poor, vulnerable, lower-middle 
class households, as compared to middle-and-upper-class households mirrors the ongoing process 
of the hollowing out of the welfare distribution and its concentration in the tails, in other words it 
mirrors polarization. 
Using consumption and socioeconomic perception data from the three comparable rounds of 
household surveys, we test whether polarization is perceived by households and seek to establish 
if it contributes to the general malaise and sense of instability reported by Moroccan households.  
Moreover, as polarization is a synonym of the hollowing out of the central deciles and growing 
gap between the poorest and the richest, we expect that the lower and central deciles will, as the 
years go by, feel relatively more threatened by economic downturns and by the fear of losing 
ground vis-à-vis richer households. Another interesting aspect of our analysis is that it covers a 
                                                            
2 These variations are calculated on the seven countries in the MENA region for which we have at least two comparable 
surveys, notably Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, West Bank and Gaza, Jordan and Iraq.    
3 See in the methodological section a detailed explanation of the method that despite the name (relative) is in fact an 
absolute measure. In this paper we report results for Morocco only, yet the other six countries follow a very similar 
pattern; these results are available upon request.    
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period (2000-2013), that includes the Arab Spring in Morocco (2011 and part of 2012). Morocco 
also experienced political and economic turbulence and change over this period, leading eventually 
to a new constitution and the introduction of social reforms. The 2013 results thus present a 
particularly good opportunity to understand whether these reforms had a visible impact on people’s 
welfare, and if they somehow modified the perception of their well-being. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the most recent debate on 
the use of relative versus absolute measures of inequality (and polarization). Section 3 gives a 
detailed account of the data and methodology employed. Section 4 discusses the results emerging 
from: (i) the analysis of subjective perceptions of well-being among Moroccan households, and 
(ii) the application of the relative distribution method (Handcock and Morris, 1998, 1999), and 
(iii) presents econometric exercises to show the links between the considered variables. A 
conclusion is presented in section 5. 
2. Relative vs. Absolute Inequality Measures 
The debate on the choice of relative or absolute measures to analyze inequality has recently gained 
momentum (Niño-Zarazua et al., 2017). In the early years of the new millennium, the effect of 
globalization on inequality became a widely debated issue both from an economic and a statistical 
point of view (Bourguignon and Morrison, 2002). The change of inequality during this period 
partially reveals how the growth generated by globalization has been divided among the haves and 
have nots (Anand and Segal, 2008, 2015). Consequently, the question of how global inequality has 
evolved is a highly politically charged issue. 
No definitive answer has yet emerged from the scientific debate on this issue (see also Milanovic, 
2002; Ravallion, 2003; Atkinson and Brandolini, 2010; Bosmans et al. 2014; Bandyopadhyay et 
al., 2017). Nonetheless, these studies agree on two main facts, namely that: (a) inequality within 
most countries is increasing,  particularly in large countries such as China, Brazil, Nigeria and the 
United States (Milanovic, 2012; van Zanden et al., 2014; Khan et al. 2017; Khan and Schettino, 
2019); and (b) growth rates in low-income countries (for example, African countries) have led to 
decreasing inequality between countries as OECD countries also faced an economic crisis over the 
same period. 
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The relative view—widely considered the standard approach— is that when all incomes are raised 
in the same proportion, the inequality does not vary. With the absolute view of inequality, only 
equal additions to all incomes do not affect inequality. The absolute measures depend on the 
absolute differences in levels in living standards, rather than relative differences, as captured by 
the ratios to the mean. As Ravallion (2003) points out, this fundamental difference can be easily 
grasped using a simple example: “Consider an economy with just two household incomes: 
US$1,000 and US$10,000. If both incomes double in size, then relative inequality will remain the 
same; the richer household is still 10 times richer. But the absolute difference in their incomes has 
doubled, from US$9,000 to US$18,000. Relative inequality is unchanged but absolute inequality 
has risen”.4  
The subjective perception of rising inequality often appears to refer to the absolute concept of 
inequality. Indeed, Ravallion (2003) finds that 40 percent of participants thought about inequality 
in absolute terms and concludes that there is no “right” or “wrong” concept, but rather that they 
reflect different value judgments about what constitutes higher levels of ‘inequality’. In other 
words, the question is whether it is more suitable to have a measure in which inequality remains 
unchanged when all incomes increase in the same proportion (i.e. the well-known property of scale 
invariance), or when an equal amount is added to all incomes (i.e. the translation invariance).  
Therefore, while relative inequality could to some extent be considered as the most adequate 
concept in empirical work in development economics (with some caveats, see Bandyopadhyay et 
al., 2017, and footnote below), concern for the absolute dimension of inequality has far-reaching 
implications for assessing the distributive consequences of economic growth (Ravallion, 2003; 
Atkinson and Brandolini, 2015). Furthermore, greater attention to absolute inequality would help 
inform important debates on development, as absolute inequality is what most people arguably see 
in their daily lives; this, in turn, underpins their concerns on distributive justice when they talk 
about the “gap between the rich and the poor” and the “widening economic divide” (Amiel and 
Cowell, 1999). 
                                                            
4 To state this more rigorously in an axiomatic framework, relative inequality in this instance is measured by using 
the axiom of scale irrelevance – a controversial axiom from the perspective of well-being in terms of capabilities or 
even utilitarian welfare comparisons.  
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3. Data and Methodology 
The data used in this paper are obtained from three rounds of Moroccan household budget surveys 
(Enquête Nationale sur les Niveaux de Vie des Ménages) held in 2000, 2006 and 2013. Household 
expenditures (per capita) are used as the main welfare indicator throughout the analysis. Since 
reliable income data are difficult to obtain, we use consumption as a measure of well-being (Deaton 
and Zaidi, 2002). Indeed, informal sectors are an important part of the workforce in these countries, 
despite difficulties involved in quantifying such income. To compare different years, consumption 
is deflated using the local CPI and further converted into 2011 international dollars, using the PPP 
conversion factor obtained from the World Development Indicators website.5 
The methodology used throughout the paper is the “relative distribution” method, a fully non-
parametric statistical framework that enables comparison of the entire consumption distribution at 
two different points in time (Handcock and Morris, 1998, 1999).6 
Despite its name, the relative distribution method produces an absolute measure of polarization. 
More formally,7 let 0Y  be the welfare variable for the reference year (2000) and Y the welfare 
variable for the comparison year (2013). The relative distribution is defined as the ratio of the 
density of the comparison year to the density of the reference year evaluated at the relative data  
r 8: 
(1)       
 
 
1
0
1
00 0
  , 0 1, 0,r r
r
f F r f y
g r r y
f yf F r

      
where  f   and  0f   denote the density functions of Y  and 0Y , respectively, and  10ry F r  is 
the quantile function of 0Y . When no changes occur between the two distributions,  g r  has a 
uniform distribution; a value of  g r  higher (lower) than 1 means that the share of households in 
                                                            
5 Accessible at: https://data.worldbank.org/. 
6 The relative distribution is a well-established approach to distributional analysis. At present, it has been employed 
by Alderson et al. (2005), Massari et al. (2009a, b), Alderson and Doran (2011, 2013), Borraz et al. (2013), Clementi 
and Schettino (2015), Nissanov and Pittau (2016), Petrarca and Ricciuti (2016), Clementi et al. (2017, 2018, 2019a, 
2019b), and Nissanov (2017). 
7 Here we limit ourselves to illustrating the basic concepts behind the use of the relative distribution method. Interested 
readers are referred to Handcock and Morris (1998, 1999) for a more detailed explication. 
8 For a formal definition of “relative data”, see infra. 
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the comparison year is higher (lower) than the corresponding share in the reference year at the thr   
quantile of the latter. 
One of the major advantages of this method is that it makes it possible to decompose the relative 
distribution into changes in location and changes in shape. The decomposition can be written as: 
(2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 00 0 0
Overall Location Shape
   ,r L r r
r r L r
f y f y f y
f y f y f y
    
  
where  0L rf y  is a counterfactual density function with the shape of the reference distribution but 
the same location as the comparison distribution. In the empirical application that follows, we use 
an additive median shift to match the locations of the reference and comparison distributions, that 
is: 
(3)    0 0 ,L r rf y f y     
where the value 0m m    is the difference between the medians of the comparison and reference 
distributions.9 
The additive transformation10 (3) appears well-suited to a counterfactual density decomposition, 
as the visual impact of equal additions is a sliding of the reference density along the -axisx  with 
no change in shape. Furthermore, it is consistent with the absolute way of summarizing inequality, 
as the Lorenz curves (and the summary inequality measures based on them) of the reference and 
counterfactual distributions are not held constant, in other words relative inequality changes. 
However, absolute inequality, which depends on the absolute differences in levels of consumption 
expenditure rather than relative differences, remains unchanged when all expenditures are 
increased or decreased by the same amount (see for example, Kolm (1976), and the discussion set 
forth in section 2). 
                                                            
9 The choice of the median as the measure for location is because population quantiles are a natural, robust and scale-
invariant unit of measurement, whereas alternative indices, such as the mean, are more sensitive to extreme 
values/outliers, and are thus not an appropriate measure of central tendency for skewed distributions. 
10  In contrast, a multiplicative location shift would modify the shape of the reference distribution. The equi-
proportionate welfare changes increase the variance and the rightward shift of the reference distribution is 
accompanied by a flattening (or shrinking) of its shape. 
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The relative distribution approach also includes a median relative polarization index, which is a 
measurement of the degree to which the comparison distribution is more polarized than the 
location-adjusted reference: 
(4) 
1
4 1  1.
2i
N
iMRP rN 
         
The values of the MRP index range between -1 and 1: positive values represent more polarization 
and negative values represent less polarization; a value of 0 indicates no differences in 
distributional shape. The MRP index can be additively decomposed into the lower relative 
polarization index (LRP) and the upper relative polarization index (URP) as follows: 
(5)  1 .
2
MRP LRP URP    
As the MRP, LRP and URP range from -1 to 1, and equal 0 when there is no change. 
We conclude our analysis by explicitly linking polarization to perception data. Specifically, we 
use a multinomial logit (MNL) model based on 2013 household data, as well as the following 
question which is used as perception indicator: 
“How is your current living standard compared to the last ten years” 
Possible answer categories are: 1 = Improved; 2 = Not changed; 3 = Worsened; 4 = Do not know.11 
In the MNL model we assume that the dependent variable is the logarithm of the ratio between the 
probability of selecting a response option and the probability of choosing the reference response 
category. In our case with 4J   categories, we contrast categories 1, 3 and 4 against 2, i.e. we 
pick the response option “Not changed” as the reference category as it merits particular attention 
in interpreting the recent trend of subjective welfare perceptions of households—see section 4(b). 
We thus estimate the following linear regression model for 2013 as: 
(6)
 
   
5 9
1 1
Pr
ln , 1,2, , , 1,3,4,
Pr 2
i
j jh ih h jk ik
h ki
Y j
MRP CLASS X i N j
Y
  
 
              
                                                            
11 Data on responses to this question come from the same survey that we used for the analysis of polarization, i.e. the 
Moroccan ‘Enquête Nationale sur les Niveaux de Vie des Ménages’. Due to their very limited number, missing 
observations were treated as ‘Do not know’. 
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where j  is a constant, jh  and jk  denote the regression coefficients to be estimated, and the 
𝑋’s are household-level controls, which include household size, gender, age, marital status, 
literacy, education, employment status and location (rural/urban and region). 
In the spirit of the relative distribution, the explanatory variable: 
(7) 
14 1, 1,2,..., ,
2i i
MRP r i N      
reflects the relative ranks (in other words, the relative data) of the 2013 consumption values in the 
median-adjusted consumption distribution of 2000, which are obtained as follows: 
(8) 1
0, if 
, if , 1, 2, , 1
1, if 
i j
j
i j i j
i N
y y
W
r y y y j N
W
y y

     


   

  
where 1 2, , , Ny y y   , with  0 0j jy y m m   , are the ordered values of the median-adjusted 
reference distribution 0LY ,  11 j i jNj j y y yjW w    1     is the running sum of the weights of 0LY , 
and 1
N
jj
W w   is the total sum of weights.12 More precisely, the polarization variable (7) 
measures how far the relative data ir  deviate from 1 2 , i.e. from the median value of a random 
variable whose distribution is the relative distribution between the comparison and the location-
adjusted reference distributions and of which the relative data represent the realizations. The 
choice of the linear transformation (four times the deviations minus 1) results in a variable taking 
values between -1 and 1 and that, on average, amounts to the value of the median relative 
polarization index given by (4). Negative values would mean that households in the lower (upper) 
quantiles of the comparison population tend to concentrate at the median of 0LY , a very strong 
sense in which they are better-off (worse-off) than households in the corresponding reference 
population. On the other hand, positive values would correspond to a situation where households 
in the lower (upper) quantiles of the comparison population tend to concentrate near the bottom 
                                                            
12 The function 
1j i jy y y  1    denotes the indicator function, which is 1 if 1j i jy y y     and 0 otherwise. 
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(top) of 0LY ,  meaning they are worse-off (better-off) than households in the corresponding 
reference population. 
Finally, the variable CLASS  is an indicator variable identifying which economic class the 
households belong to. We defined four thresholds, using different lines calculated by the World 
Bank to define different social statuses: 3.2 $ PPP; 5.5, $ PPP; 10 $ PPP; and 20 $ PPP per capita 
per day. Using them, we create five distinct groups based on their consumption per capita per year: 
these are the “poor” (annual consumption per capita ≤ 1,170 $ PPP), “vulnerable” (1,170 < annual 
consumption per capita ≤ 2,000 $ PPP), “lower-middle class” (2,000 < annual consumption per 
capita ≤ 3,650 $ PPP), “middle class” (3,650 < annual consumption per capita ≤ 7,300 $ PPP) and 
“upper-middle class” (annual consumption per capita > 7,300 $PPP). In model (6), this variable is 
interacted with M R P  to investigate how the correlation of the latter with households’ welfare 
perceptions varies across classes with different economic status. 
4. Results 
As pointed out in the previous sections, one of the main goals of this paper consists in showing 
how absolute measures evolve in line with households’ welfare perception. Therefore, after 
describing the theoretical differences between the two sets of indices and the data, we proceed by 
reporting the results from perception indicators obtained from the three rounds of Moroccan 
household surveys. Before analyzing the perception outcomes that, as we will see, are strongly 
correlated with the class composition of Moroccan society, we outline a brief overview on 
Morocco’s economic performance and welfare distribution.  
4.a Poverty, (relative) inequality and class composition in Morocco: 2000-2013 
While real GDP per capita increased by about 1.5 percent per annum and showed substantial 
volatility throughout the 1990s, the following decade (the 2000s) began with a much more stable 
pattern of growth and substantially higher annual rates. GDP per capita increased at an annual rate 
of 3.1 percent between 2001 and 2017, almost doubling from 15,702 Moroccan dirhams in 2001 
to nearly 26,217 dirhams in 2017 (Figure 1 and Pinto Moreira, 2019).   
11 
 
Growth, however, has not been accompanied by rapid economic modernization and significant 
labor market outcomes. Indeed, the Moroccan economy created an average of 115,000 jobs 
annually between 2000 and 2013, which was insufficient to absorb the annual increase of the 
working-age population (HCP and WB, 2017a). Also, informality is widespread as only 17 percent 
of the labor force has a regular contract. Women and young people are particularly disadvantaged. 
Compared to other MENA region countries, female participation in the labor force is low and 
declined from 28.1 percent in 2000 to 22.4 percent in 2017; over the same period the youth 
unemployment rate increased from 19.6 percent to 26.5 percent, especially among the highly 
educated. 
Figure 1: Morocco’s growth incidence curves for per capita consumption, 2000-2013  
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Morocco’s household surveys 
Poverty was reduced from 24 percent in 2001 to 7.7 percent in 2013.13 GDP growth, therefore, has 
translated into high growth of household consumption, particularly for the bottom 40 percent of 
the distribution (HCP and WB, 2017b). Compared to an average growth rate of consumption of 
about 3.4 percent between 2001 and 2013, the consumption of the bottom 40 percent grew at about 
3.6/3.7 percent (Figure 1). Indeed, in relative terms the poorest tended to benefit more than those 
between the 60 and the 95 percentiles of the consumption distribution. Over the same period, 
                                                            
13 Measured with the national poverty line, the decline is from 15 percent to 4.8 percent (HCP and WB, 2017b).  
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inequality, as measured by the Gini index, declined slightly to below 40 percent (39.5 percent)—
a particularly high value when compared to the rest of MENA region.  
This slight decline was the result of two counter-balancing trends: convergence of development 
across regions and increased intra-region inequality in some regions. Indeed, inequality increased 
mostly in the coastal regions (with the notable exception of the Casablanca region), while it 
decreased in the inner and eastern parts of the country. Likewise, relative polarization measures 
such as the Foster and Wolfson (1992, 2010) slightly declined from 35.15 in 2000 to 32.87 in 2013. 
As can be seen in the stochastic dominance curves in Figure 2, growth has been moderately pro-
poor, and have had an effect on Morocco’s class composition. By comparing the three curves 
(2001, 2006, 2013), we can observe a clear rightward shift of consumption distribution, which in 
terms of socioeconomic status, determined: (i) an upgrading of households belonging to the second 
and third deciles graduating from poor to vulnerable over a decade; (ii) an upgrading of households 
belonging to the 4th to 6th deciles moving to “lower-middle class” status; (iii) an upgrading of the 
8th decile entering the middle classes. In 2013, the poor occupy the bottom decile, the vulnerable 
the 2nd and 3rd deciles, the lower-middle class the 4th to the 7th deciles, the middle class the 8th to 
the 9th deciles, the upper class the 10th decile. 
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Figure 2: Stochastic dominance curves: 2000, 2006 and 2013 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Morocco’s household surveys. 
4.b Perception indicators  
The focus of our analysis in this section is on the results emerging from the welfare perception in 
the decade preceding each wave. The 2001, 2006 and 2013 household surveys had a dedicated 
question on general welfare perception, which is fully comparable through the three waves; 
however, beginning with the 2006 survey, a new section explicitly asks respondents to address the 
issue of subjective poverty. The respondent is always the household head on behalf of the whole 
family.   
Figure 3 refers to two non-overlapping points in time (2000 and 2013) and offers insights of trends 
over more than 20 years (i.e. from 1991 to 2013). The 2006 result lies somewhere between the 
2000 and 2013 results (provided upon request). Throughout this section we use the above-
mentioned class definition to group household perception. One possible caveat to this approach is 
that the size of the surveyed groups has tended to change over time as people have become 
upwardly mobile and entered more affluent groups. However, a comparison of the results of the 
quintiles in Figure 3(b) shows that this potential bias is not a genuine concern, as the same trends 
and variations identified in the analysis by classes can be easily detected when analyzing the results 
by quintiles.    
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Figure 3: Perception of current living standard compared to the last 10 years 
(a) By classes (b) By quintiles 
  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Morocco’s household surveys. 
Figure 3(a) plots the results of the question “How is your current living standard compared to the 
last ten years?” by classes. A couple of clear trends emerge. Firstly, the households surveyed in 
the year 2000, particularly those considered to be among the poorest, perceived a very sharp 
decline in their living standards compared to the previous ten years (the 1990s), despite the fact 
that consumption levels had increased, and that poverty had declined (HCP, 2001; HCP and WB, 
2017b). Indeed, in the same year, the share of households declaring that their welfare had declined 
was much higher than the share of those declaring it had improved. The shares of positive and 
negative perception vary a lot by classes: the poorer the class, the higher the share of those 
declaring that their welfare declined. In contrast, the share of households stating that their welfare 
improved increases monotonically with consumption: higher deciles show a higher propensity to 
have a positive perception. A generalized sense of a highly polarized society in which only the top 
deciles were perceived to have benefitted from the slow and volatile growth of the 1990s had 
already begun to form in early 2000 (Pinto Moreira, 2019). 
Second, while we observe some important differences between 2001 and 2013, the above-
mentioned monotonic structure is preserved. The share of “Improved” increased for all 
classes/quintiles and the share of “Worsened” decreased for all classes/quantiles. Overall, people 
perceived an improvement in living conditions in line with growth patterns; in relative terms, 
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however, the richest perceived considerably greater improvements than the poorest. Indeed, those 
belonging to the bottom four classes only saw a marginal increase in the share of “Improved”, 
while the largest differences are observed only in the upper classes (+17 percent more). On the 
positive side, there is a sharp decline in the share of those whose situation worsened, so much so 
that the share of those in the lower classes declaring they faced improved conditions is about the 
same as the share of those declaring a decline; in addition, the further up we progress in welfare 
distribution, the more the share of “Declined” declines against the share of “Improved”. 
Finally, it is very important to look at the trend of those declaring “Not changed”. This trend is 
also monotonic and declining as in the share of households declaring a worsening, but its 
interpretation deserves particular attention: after a not particularly rewarding decade, the fact that 
the lower classes were declaring no change has a completely different meaning than for those of 
the upper classes declaring the same thing. This may be a positive outcome for households 
belonging to the top classes but represents a negative outcome for those belonging to the bottom 
classes: in the latter case, nothing has changed, even after a long and sustained period of growth 
and rapid poverty reduction. 
It is also interesting to compare the “objective” social status (class) with the perceived class. 
Unfortunately, this specific section of the questionnaire was only included in the 2006 survey, so 
we could only compare it to the results of the 2013 survey. We focused our attention on the 
question: “In what social level do you rank your household in comparison with what prevails in 
your social environment (douar or neighborhood)?” 
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Figure 4: Perception of households' social level in comparison with own social environment 
(a) By classes (b) By quintiles 
  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Morocco’s household surveys. 
In both rounds of the survey, the majority of households did not consider themselves as richer than 
the average households belonging to the social contexts in which they lived. It is worth noting that 
the share of households that considered themselves as poorer than other households was 
particularly high in the first quintile, and then declined quasi-monotonically through to the top one. 
Nonetheless, there are important nuances to this general trend. For example, while the (largely 
pessimistic) subjective perception recorded in 2013 among the poorest classes had slowly declined, 
as compared to 2006, something had clearly changed among the newly graduated vulnerable and 
the lower-middle class households. In both cases the (correct) perception of ranking in the middle 
declined considerably, proportionally raising their awareness of being relatively poorer than other 
households. Also, the middle classes considered that their perceived status had decreased; 
however, 70 percent of respondents from this social class did not feel poorer than other households. 
Finally, the “class-consciousness” of upper-class households declined slightly in 2013 but still 
stood above 80 percent. 
The sense of frustration and perception of non-improvement shared by many Moroccans is further 
corroborated by an analysis of specific issues of concern to Moroccans in the course of their daily 
lives. For the sake of brevity, we decided to report only four results: two relating to the type of 
expenses that posed a problem for households over the past 10 years, for example, schooling and 
transports; and two relating to future issues of concern, for example, lower purchasing power and 
criminality (Figure 5). 
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Figure 5: Negative perception on specific issues 
(a) Among your expenses in the last 10 years, did … pose you a problem? 
Schooling Transports 
  
(b) Is … a concern for your future? 
Lower purchasing power Criminality 
  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Morocco’s household surveys 
The top two panels in Figure 5 report two sources of expenses that have become particularly 
burdensome for Moroccan households, notably schooling and transport. All classes, with the 
exception of the upper classes, declare that these two expenses had become a serious source of 
concern between 2001 and 2013. In 2013, 70 and 60 percent of the poor and vulnerable, 
respectively, declared that they struggled with schooling expenses; however, in 2001 only 40 
percent of them declared having experienced difficulties with these expenses. Interestingly, the 
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rapid urbanization process that Morocco experienced in the 2000s amplified the importance of 
transport costs. Job opportunities have increasingly become more concentrated in big towns, 
obliging people to commute and spend much more on transport than in the past; they have also 
faced difficulties as public transport has not kept pace with increasing demand. In 2000, about 20 
percent of respondents in almost all classes declared that public transport was an issue; however, 
in 2013 transport was an issue of serious concern for the majority of the bottom four classes. 
The future also looks gloomier for many Moroccan households (Figure 5, lower panels). When 
asked to judge whether a number of common problems, ranging from youth unemployment to a 
lack of security concerned them, the answer was in most cases “Yes”. We decided to report just 
the result from the questions on the reduction in purchasing power and criminality, but for most of 
the other questions the response and the pattern is very similar: there was a much higher share of 
“Yes”, particularly among the central and lower strata of the population. 
Overall, the results on perception suggest that perceived economic instability and 
social insecurity rose between 2001 and 2013. The perspective of younger 
generations, as captured in questions about their future, schooling or unemployment, 
which was particularly concerning for parents. The impression is that large segments 
of Moroccan society did not feel secure about their status and were very skeptical 
about transmitting the same level of well-being to future generations. Combining all 
the pieces of this puzzle, we find clear signs that Moroccan fear “déclassement”,or 
losing the status that they obtained at a high cost. These fears continue to exist despite 
the important economic and political reforms launched by Morocco in 2011—reforms 
which probably came too late to reverse the general sense of malaise that has 
accumulated for such a long time.4.c Absolute measures of polarization 
As opposed to the relative measures which, as previously mentioned, marginally declined, absolute 
measures increased substantially between 2001 and 2013. The absolute Gini, i.e. the Gini index 
multiplied by the mean of the distribution, grew by 50 percent, whereas the absolute version of the 
Foster and Wolfson’s polarization measure increased by 45 percent.14 While already indicating a 
                                                            
14 Formally, the Foster-Wolfson index is defined as: 
 2 ,FW B WP G G
m
   
where  , m , BG and WG  are, respectively, the mean, the median, the between-group Gini coefficient and the within-
group Gini coefficient, and where it is assumed that there are only two income groups: an income level below the 
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clear trend, these proposed synthetic measures fail to indicate where the changes take place. To 
further analyze absolute polarization, we therefore used the “relative distribution” method. This 
combines the strengths of summary absolute polarization indices with the possibility of graphically 
visualizing the differences in the shape and in the medians of the compared distributions. 
Figure 6 presents the results of the relative distribution analysis for Morocco between 2000 and 
2013. Panel (a) depicts the overall relative distribution, while the location effect, i.e. the effect 
only due to the median shift, is shown in the panel (b) of Figure 6. Finally, panel (c) displays the 
shape effect, which represents the relative distribution net of the median influence. 
 
 
Figures 6: Relative consumption distribution for Morocco between 2000 and 2013 
(a) Overall (b) Location 
  
(c) Shape 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Morocco’s household surveys. 
                                                            
median; and an income level above the median. The index ranges within the interval [0,1], being equal to 0 in case of 
a perfectly equal distribution (all the incomes are equal) and equal to 1 for a perfect bimodal distribution, where half 
of the population has no income, and each member of the other half has an income level that is equal to twice the 
mean income level. An ‘absolute’ counterpart of the above index can be constructed by multiplying it by the median. 
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The overall results show that, guided by an increase in consumption, the households shift from the 
lower deciles of the distribution to the middle and the upper parts. Indeed, the values of the deciles 
in the upper tail of the distribution are higher than 1, which means that there are more households 
in that decile of the distribution in the last year of analysis than there were in the first year. 
Panel (b) presents the effect due only to the median shift, i.e. the pattern that the relative density 
would have displayed if there had been no change in distributional shape, but only a location shift 
of the density. The effect of the median shift was quite large. This alone would have moved a 
substantial proportion of Moroccan households in 2000 out of the two lowest deciles of the 
reference distribution and placed them in the other upper deciles of the distribution. 
Looking at panel (c), which shows the shape effect, it is clear that there is a concentration in the 
tails of the distribution. Values above 1 indicate that, in relative terms, there are more households 
in that decile of the distribution at the end of the examined period than there were at the beginning. 
Therefore, relative to the initial period, households in the lowest deciles increased by about 14 
percent (+1.4 over 1) in the lowest decile, and by 5 percent (+0.5 over 1). Therefore, the trend is 
more marked in the lower part of the distribution, while a similar but smaller change is observed 
for the upper tail, with an increase in the last two deciles. Thus, once changes in real median 
expenditure are netted out, a U-shaped relative density is observed; this supports prior findings on 
the more unequal and more polarized distribution of consumption expenditure in the course of the 
past two decades. 
The relative polarization measures capture the above changes well. The MRP index equals 0.24, 
and is statistically significant at the 5 percent level.15 Looking at the contributions to the 
distributional change made by the segments of the distribution above and below the median, we 
find that the MRP is not evenly distributed in the two tails: the LRP = 0.32 is twice as positive as 
the URP = 0.16, which is consistent with the visual impression from the shape shift towards the 
upper tail. Thus, both the lower and upper halves of the 2013 consumption distribution Are more 
widely spread out than the lower and upper halves of the 2000 consumption distribution. About 
16 percent (half the LRP) of households in the lower half shift from the center of the distribution 
                                                            
15 The null hypothesis of “No change” with respect to the reference distribution is tested for each index. 
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to the lower deciles, whereas about 8 percent (half the URP) of households in the upper half shift 
from more central values towards the upper tail of the distribution. 
a. Econometric Outcomes 
In this section, we use standard econometrics to test the association between consumption 
polarization and household self-reported welfare. 
For the sake of brevity, the estimation results presented here only refer to the interaction between 
M R P  and the factor variable CLASS —the full econometric results can be found in the appendix. 
Figure 7(a) is a plot of the corresponding estimated coefficients (with 95 percent confidence 
intervals) interpreted in terms of relative risk rates, which can be obtained through the 
exponentiation of the estimated MNL coefficients.16 Since the MNL model estimates 1J   
equation, where the thJ  equation is relative to the reference category, the relative risk rate of a 
coefficient indicates how the probability of selecting a response option compared to the probability 
of choosing the reference response category changes with the variable in question. In particular, a 
relative risk rate greater than 1 indicates that the probability of selecting, say, the response option 
“Improved”, as compared to that of responding “Not changed”, increases as the variable MRP  
(and hence polarization) increases. On the contrary, a relative risk rate less than 1 indicates that 
the probability of selecting the response option “Improved” compared to that of responding “Not 
changed” decreases with polarization. 
Figure 7: Relative risk rates obtained from multinomial logit regressions: improved (above) and worsened
(below) 
(a) By classes (b) By quintiles 
                                                            
16 The figure does not show the relative risk rate estimates for ‘Do not know’, due to the irrelevance of this answering 
option for assessing the evolution of households’ welfare perceptions. 
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on Morocco’s household surveys. 
As opposed to results for “Worsened”, for which most of the coefficients are not statistically 
significant, the results for “Improved” relative to “Not changed” are particularly insightful with 
respect to the relation between consumption polarization and household self-reported welfare. 
Keeping all the other variables constant, if polarization were to increase, the relative probability 
of declaring that a household’s welfare improved, rather than not changed, is 
 1 0.431 100 56.9%    lower for the poor,  1 0.574 100 42.6%    lower for the vulnerable, 
and  1 0.872 100 12.8%    lower for households in the lower-middle class—albeit the 95 
percent confidence interval of the corresponding relative risk rate overlaps with 1 (0.713—1.068); 
hence, this decrease in relative probability is not significant. For middle-class and upper-middle-
class households, the same relative probabilities are, respectively,  3.217 1 100 221.7%    and 
 3.425 1 100 242.5%    higher. 
Similar results hold vis-à-vis a robustness check where model (6) was re-estimated by replacing 
the factor variable CLASS  with a new indicator variable QGP  identifying quintiles of expenditure, 
i.e.: 
(9)     
5 9
1 1
Pr
ln , 1, 2, , , 1,3, 4.
Pr 2
i
j jh ih h jk ik
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Y j
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 
               
The results, visually displayed in Figure 7(b), still correspond to the previously described pattern: 
for “Improved” relative to “Not changed”, if polarization were to increase, the relative probability 
for households to declare that their welfare improved, rather than not changed, is 
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 1 0.492 100 50.8%    lower for the first quintile,  1 0.597 100 40.3%    lower for the 
second, and  1 0.960 100 4.0%    lower for the third quintile—although this estimate is not 
significant. In contrast, for the last two quintiles of expenditure the estimated relative probabilities 
are, respectively,  1.781 1 100 78.1%    and  2.851 1 100 285.1%    higher. 
We conducted the same exercise by separately estimating our model by the respondent’s sex, age 
groups and location (urban/rural) to check for robustness and to control for the respondents’ 
heterogeneity. In Figure 8 we reported the results of the model by the household head’s gender, 
while the other results are available upon request.  Overall, in all these models using the class 
dimension as independent variable (but the results by class are very similar), the above-mentioned 
pattern of negative association between polarization and perception among the lower classes and 
vice versa is upheld, even controlling for household respondents’ heterogeneity: no significant 
differences were discerned if household heads are male or female, young or adult, or living in 
urban or rural settings.        
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Relative risk rates obtained from multinomial logit regressions: improved (above) and worsened
(below) 
(a) Male household head respondent  (b)Female household head respondent 
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on Morocco’s household surveys. 
The final robustness check is reported in Figure 9 and additional results are available upon request. 
As mentioned in section 4b, the response “Not change” can assume a very different meaning if 
pronounced by people in lower classes or in higher classes. In order to verify whether this is the 
case or in other words if the base category in previous regressions is a heterogenous category, we 
run two different logit models where the dependent variable is in the first case a dummy that 
assumes value 1 when the household head answered either worsened or not changed while in the 
second case another dummy that assumes value 1 when the household head responded that it  had 
improved or not changed. The gist behind this test is twofold. First to  show that even if we put 
together the response not change to either worsened or improved, we can replicate the same “class 
dynamic” evidenced by the multi-logit and secondly that the “Not  change category” for the poorest 
looks much closer to the “Worsened” case while for the rich is closer to the “Improved” answer.   
Figure 9a confirms the robustness of the multi-logit results. A high percentage of the wealthiest 
respondents declared that conditions had improved, and in their case, polarization remained 
positively associated with improved conditions; however, as before, even adding the “Not 
changed” response to “Improved” does not change much for the poorest. The negative association 
between polarization and perceived welfare improvements among the lower classes remained 
significant. Figure 9b substantially improves the significance of the results and outlines a much 
clearer class-based pattern. Among the poorest, the positive association between polarization and 
perception of worsened condition becomes very significant, while for the rich the opposite holds.   
Figure 9: Relative risk rates obtained from logit regressions 
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(a) Dependent variable: 0 = “Worsened + Do not 
know”; 1 = “Improved + Not 
changed” 
 
(b) Dependent variable: 0 = “Improved + Do not 
know”; 1 = “Worsened + Not 
changed” 
  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Morocco’s household surveys. 
Overall, the econometric findings on polarization and households’ perceptions of welfare 
consistently converge towards the narrative outlined in section 4(b). In 2013, compared to the 
previous 10 years, households belonging to the bottom four classes only see a marginal increase 
in the share of “Improved”, while the big difference is observed only in the upper-middle class. 
On the other hand, there is a sharp increase in the share of those declaring “Not changed”, 
especially for the lower classes where in presence of long and sustained growth this could well 
represent a negative outcome. As shown, this pattern is significantly correlated with the increasing 
polarization that has affected the distribution of welfare in Morocco between 2000 and 2013. 
5. Conclusions 
The foregoing analysis raises the question of whether the Arab puzzle exists. Inequality and 
polarization do not seem to play a role in explaining the dissatisfaction and sense of frustration 
that led many Arabs to call for radical reforms, and in some cases seek to overthrow their regimes. 
Our paper suggests that in the case of Morocco, polarization does play a role: the main finding of 
this paper is that we should use absolute measures rather than relative measures.  
Three rounds of Moroccan household surveys offer the opportunity to gauge the evolution of 
polarization and the perception of well-being in a large sample of Moroccan households. Also, the 
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period considered is of interest since it covers the pre- and post-Moroccan Arab Spring, and the 
subsequent political and economic changes set in motion by the protests. 
A preliminary analysis of the two sets of variables already indicates that they do not go at par.   
Although Moroccan households experienced an improvement in their living standard between 
2001 and 2013 and escaped from poverty and vulnerability to graduate into the middle classes – 
more than 70 percent of Moroccan households indicate that their well-being did not improve 
compared to the last 10 years. There is, however, a lot of variation depending on social status. 
While most of the poor, vulnerable and lower-middle-class households experienced few 
improvements compared to the last 10 years, middle-class households (but mostly those in the 
upper class) appear to have benefitted the most. When compared to the responses of the 2001 
survey, the result is clearer. The upper classes appear to have experienced a significant increase in 
the share of those seeing their well-being improved; however, the share of those other classes 
experiencing an improvement did not vary much, with the only positive change being an increase 
in those declaring that conditions had not changed for them, as well as a reduction in the share of 
those seeing a decline. 
To further confirm the general perception that improvements in welfare had not been uniformly 
distributed—a trend captured in household perception – we looked at the perceived status (poorer 
or richer than neighbors) and compared the results from the 2006 and 2013 surveys, as this section 
of the questionnaire was not available in the 2001 survey data. Despite these improvements, in 
both rounds most households did not consider themselves richer than the households living in their 
neighborhood; however, as in the previous case, the perception of relative poverty is higher among 
the poorest and declines quasi-monotonically through to the top one. What is striking is finding 
how much this perception worsened among the lower and middle classes along with their absolute 
shares: in 2013 almost 50 percent of those in the lower middle class, and 30 percent of those in the 
middle class declared themselves either poorer or very poor compared to their peers, whereas in 
2006 these percentages stood at 30 and 15 percent, respectively. 
In the second part of the paper we linked these preliminary findings on perception to polarization. 
Our hypothesis is that the ongoing process of absolute polarization which was detected through 
the use of the relative distribution method conditions the perception of household’s well-being. 
Exploiting the chance to construct a dynamic indicator of polarization, i.e. by using the relative 
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distribution to compare the situation in 2013 to the reference situation in 2001 at the household 
level, and linking it to household perception, it is possible to test whether absolute polarization is 
linked to household perception. To our knowledge this is the first attempt to explain, at such 
granular level, the correlation of absolute polarization with well-being perception. 
Results from the multi-logit regression where we also control for standard household-level 
characteristics, for example, such as education, employment, location, etc., indicate that 
polarization is significantly linked to perception, and most importantly that this relation is 
asymmetric. By interacting the polarization indicator with dummy variables defining classes of 
welfare (poor, vulnerable, etc.), we find that the poorer the household, the more polarization is 
perceived to be linked to the well-being of the household, while the richer it is the more 
polarization will positively link to its perceived well-being. Results are robust with respect to the 
use of classes or quintiles for ranking social groups from the poorest to the richest and other 
specifications. 
In conclusion, while absolute polarization is growing in many countries (Nissanov and Pittau, 
2016; Petrarca and Ricciuti, 2016; Clementi et al., 2017), few analytical works explicitly link this 
pattern to a respondent’s unhappiness about his or her socioeconomic condition. Morocco offers a 
unique opportunity in this regard for two related reasons. First, the Moroccan household surveys 
collect reliable and comparable data on perception, and second because these data made it possible 
to document that, despite making important economic progress, Moroccan citizens appeared 
dissatisfied with their socioeconomic situation and were very concerned about their future. At first 
glance, there was no apparent link between this negative perception and welfare distribution; 
poverty rates fell and inequality, as measured by the Gini index, did not vary. In contrast, 
exercising the theoretical option to link people’s perception and an underlying household level 
measure of absolute polarization, enabled us to show that perception is indeed significantly linked 
to welfare distribution. 
The potential applications of this new method can be implemented beyond Morocco. According 
to some preliminary analysis that has been undertaken, other countries in the MENA region show 
evidence of growing polarization, and as in Morocco their citizens seem to be quite unhappy about 
their socioeconomic status. A broad regional analysis in the spirit of the present paper might indeed 
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shed additional light on the root causes of the socio-political instability of the MENA region over 
the past two decades. 
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6. Appendix  
 
 Class model (1) Quintile model (2) 
Dependent variable Evolution of the standard of living during the last 10 years 
Evolution of the standard of living during 
the last 10 years 
Improved 
Household size 0.104*** 0.0962*** 
 [0.0145] [0.0142] 
   
Male 0 0 
 [.] [.] 
   
Female -0.158 -0.156 
 [0.136] [0.136] 
   
Age -0.00249 -0.00175 
 [0.00221] [0.00220] 
   
Single 0 0 
 [.] [.] 
   
Married -0.00906 -0.0240 
 [0.152] [0.151] 
   
Divorced -0.109 -0.129 
 [0.226] [0.226] 
   
Widower 0.00567 -0.00724 
 [0.190] [0.190] 
   
Literate 0 0 
 [.] [.] 
   
Illiterate -0.104 -0.117 
 [0.147] [0.147] 
   
None -0.305 -0.353 
 [0.181] [0.181] 
   
Pre-school -0.226 -0.273 
 [0.146] [0.145] 
   
Primary -0.395*** -0.444*** 
 [0.117] [0.116] 
   
Secondary -0.233* -0.262* 
 [0.116] [0.115] 
   
Tertiary 0 0 
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 [.] [.] 
   
Other -0.195 -0.139 
 [0.148] [0.144] 
   
Employed 0 0 
 [.] [.] 
   
Unemployed -0.436* -0.440* 
 [0.179] [0.178] 
   
Inactive -0.0830 -0.0824 
 [0.0720] [0.0718] 
   
Urban 0 0 
 [.] [.] 
   
Rural 0.149** 0.125* 
 [0.0563] [0.0559] 
   
Tanger-Tetouan-Al Hoceima -0.0440 -0.0421 
 [0.0889] [0.0889] 
   
Oriental -0.307** -0.320** 
 [0.112] [0.111] 
   
Fès-Meknès 0.119 0.104 
 [0.0881] [0.0880] 
   
Rabat-Salé-Kénitra 0.421*** 0.406*** 
 [0.0855] [0.0848] 
   
Béni Mellal-Khénifra 0.257** 0.234* 
 [0.0956] [0.0950] 
   
Casablanca-Settat 0 0 
 [.] [.] 
   
Marrakech-Safi -0.352*** -0.360*** 
 [0.0870] [0.0871] 
   
Drâa-Tafilalet 1.463*** 1.436*** 
 [0.140] [0.139] 
   
Souss-Massa 0.423*** 0.411*** 
 [0.0999] [0.0997] 
   
Guelmim-Oued Noun 0.482* 0.474* 
 [0.190] [0.190] 
   
Laâoune-Sakia El Hamra 0.609** 0.591** 
 [0.186] [0.186] 
   
Dakhla-Oued Ed-Dahab 0.303 0.314 
 [0.213] [0.212] 
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Poor # Granular MRP  -0.843***  
 [0.127]  
   
Vulnerable # Granular MRP  -0.554***  
 [0.103]  
   
Lower-middle class # 
Granular MRP  -0.136  
 [0.103]  
   
Middle class # Granular MRP 1.168***  
 [0.133]  
   
Upper-middle class # 
Granular MRP  1.231
***  
 [0.106]  
   
Q1 # Granular MRP   -0.709*** 
  [0.0858] 
   
Q2 # Granular MRP   -0.516*** 
  [0.146] 
   
Q3 # Granular MRP   -0.0411 
  [0.0890] 
   
Q4 # Granular MRP   0.577** 
  [0.217] 
   
Q5 # Granular MRP   1.048*** 
  [0.0863] 
   
Constant -0.477* -0.320 
 [0.214] [0.209] 
   
Worsened 
Household size -0.00704 -0.00808 
 [0.0152] [0.0149] 
   
Male 0 0 
 [.] [.] 
   
Female 0.0210 0.0201 
 [0.122] [0.121] 
   
Age -0.000504 -0.000513 
 [0.00231] [0.00231] 
   
Single 0 0 
 [.] [.] 
   
Married -0.229 -0.232 
 [0.160] [0.159] 
   
Divorced 0.479* 0.473* 
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 [0.210] [0.210] 
   
Widower 0.206 0.201 
 [0.184] [0.184] 
   
Literate 0 0 
 [.] [.] 
   
Illiterate -0.138 -0.147 
 [0.162] [0.161] 
   
None 0.113 0.126 
 [0.209] [0.208] 
   
Pre-school 0.0317 0.0405 
 [0.169] [0.169] 
   
Primary 0.170 0.174 
 [0.141] [0.141] 
   
Secondary 0.221 0.225 
 [0.141] [0.141] 
   
Tertiary 0 0 
 [.] [.] 
   
Other 21.60*** 22.17*** 
 [0.990] [0.993] 
   
Employed 0 0 
 [.] [.] 
   
Unemployed 0.727*** 0.733*** 
 [0.150] [0.150] 
   
Inactive 0.295*** 0.296*** 
 [0.0724] [0.0725] 
   
Urban 0 0 
 [.] [.] 
   
Rural -0.210*** -0.213*** 
 [0.0598] [0.0595] 
   
Tanger-Tetouan-Al Hoceima 0.132 0.133 
 [0.0932] [0.0932] 
   
Oriental 0.388*** 0.389*** 
 [0.102] [0.102] 
   
Fès-Meknès 0.211* 0.212* 
 [0.0872] [0.0872] 
   
Rabat-Salé-Kénitra 0.353*** 0.355*** 
 [0.0882] [0.0881] 
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Béni Mellal-Khénifra -0.198 -0.202 
 [0.104] [0.104] 
   
Casablanca-Settat 0 0 
 [.] [.] 
   
Marrakech-Safi -0.737*** -0.737*** 
 [0.0996] [0.0997] 
   
Drâa-Tafilalet 0.413* 0.405* 
 [0.164] [0.164] 
   
Souss-Massa 0.0851 0.0880 
 [0.105] [0.105] 
   
Guelmim-Oued Noun -0.173 -0.168 
 [0.224] [0.223] 
   
Laâoune-Sakia El Hamra 0.00676 0.0169 
 [0.209] [0.210] 
   
Dakhla-Oued Ed-Dahab 0.717*** 0.718*** 
 [0.205] [0.205] 
   
Poor # Granular MRP  0.111  
 [0.119]  
   
Vulnerable # Granular MRP  0.273**  
 [0.100]  
   
Lower-middle class # 
Granular MRP  -0.121  
 [0.110]  
   
Middle class # Granular MRP 0.0969  
 [0.150]  
   
Upper-middle class # 
Granular MRP  -0.128  
 [0.121]  
   
Q1 # Granular MRP   0.166* 
  [0.0813] 
   
Q2 # Granular MRP   0.255 
  [0.153] 
   
Q3 # Granular MRP   -0.104 
  [0.0923] 
   
Q4 # Granular MRP   0.373 
  [0.199] 
   
Q5 # Granular MRP   -0.101 
  [0.0969] 
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Constant -0.409  [0.229] 
-0.373 
[0.224]  
Observations                                                       15970                                                            15970                                
Standard errors in brackets * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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